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Executive Summary 
 
The purpose of this study was to provide empirical evidence on which law 
enforcement can base enhanced proactive identity theft control and prevention 
efforts. It focuses on identity theft offenders, which sets it apart from previous 
surveys and other research which have centered on identity theft victims. As a 
result of the study of closed United States Secret Service cases with an identity 
theft component (2000-2006), empirical data concerning the key factors relevant 
to the criminal behavior of identity thieves and the conditions under which that 
behavior occurs are available to law enforcement agencies and corporate 
security and fraud investigators for the first time. The results fill a gap identified in 
the President’s Identity Theft Task Force report. The report states, “Unlike some 
groups of criminals, identity thieves cannot be readily classified. No surveys 
provide comprehensive data on their primary personal or demographic 
characteristics” (April 2007, p, 12).This study has gathered and analyzed 
comprehensive data on identity theft offenders in order to provide both the public 
and private sectors with information they need to combat these crimes. 
 
For the purposes of this study, the definition of identity theft is aligned with that 
presented in the President’s Identity Theft Task Force report, Combating Identity 
Theft: A Strategic Plan. “Although identity theft is defined in many different ways, 
it is, fundamentally, the misuse of another individual’s personal information to 
commit fraud” (April 2007, p. 2). Personal information includes name, address, 
Social Security number, and date of birth, but excludes credit cards, debit cards, 
and other bank cards. The data for the study was collected at the Secret Service 
headquarters by the four authors of this report. Seven hundred and thirty four 
cases with an identity theft component, which were opened and closed between 
2000 and 2006, were reviewed; data was collected on 517, as the other 217 
were excluded. 
 
Findings 
 
After the data collection and analysis were completed, the findings were 
separated into four categories:  the case, the offenders, the commission of the 
crime, and victimization.  Highlights of these areas follow. 
 
The Case: 
 
Case characteristics include Secret Service classification, Secret Service region, 
referral to Secret Service, jurisdiction, statutes violated, disposition, actual dollar 
loss, timing and duration, and geographical scope.   
•  Many of the cases were classified as “Fraudulent Use of Account Number” 
and “Identity Theft.”   
•  The highest percentage of cases was from Region 1 – Northeastern 
United States and were referred to the Secret Service by local or state law 
enforcement.     2
•  The cases were referred to the Secret Service from various sources. 
o  Approximately 47% of the cases were referred to the Secret 
Service by local and state law enforcement agencies. 
o  Corporate security and/or fraud investigators referred 20.4% of the 
cases. 
•  Most cases fell under federal jurisdiction, with 18 USC 1028, Identity 
Fraud, and 18 USC 1029, Access Device Fraud, most frequently violated.   
•  Approximately half of the defendants in the cases were sentenced to 
incarceration, often in combination with probation, and restitution. 
•  The median actual dollar loss was $31,356.  
 
The Offenders: 
 
The data analysis showed more diversity among the age, race, gender, and 
criminal backgrounds of offenders than the picture held by conventional wisdom.  
•  Most of the offenders – 42.5% -- were between 25 and 34 years of age at 
the time that the case was opened. 
o  The 35 – 49 age group made up 33% of the offenders.  
o  18.5% were between 18 and 24 years old.  
o   The remaining 6% were 50 years old or older.  
•  53.8% of the offenders were black; 38.3% were white.   
•  One third of the offenders were female.   
o  Of the females, almost two thirds were black.   
•  24.1% of the offenders were born outside of the United States. 
•  71% of the offenders had no arrest history.   
o  Of those who did, a third were for fraud, forgery, or identity theft or 
fraud. 
•  The most prevalent motive of the offenders was personal gain.  It took 
several forms including using fraudulently obtained personal identifying 
information to: 
o  Obtain and use credit 
o Procure  cash 
o  Conceal actual identity 
o  Apply for loans to purchase motor vehicles 
 
The Commission of the Crime: 
 
The data was examined to determine the modus operandi of the offenders, the 
organized nature of the crimes and offenders, and identity theft through 
employment. 
•  In most of the cases, the identity theft facilitated other offenses. 
o  The most frequent offense that was facilitated by identity theft was 
fraud. 
o  The next most frequent was larceny. 
•  Organized group activity was discerned in 42.4% of the cases – involving 
from 2- 45 offenders.    3
o  The roles that the defendants took varied, but most frequently 
involved stealing or obtaining personal identifying information and 
using it for personal gain.  
o  In cases with three or more offenders, there is definite coordination 
and organization, allowing the group to take advantage of criminal 
opportunities, to create opportunities for crime, and to avoid 
detection.  
•  In approximately half of the cases, the Internet and/or other technological 
devices were used in the commission of the crime.   
o  Within the half with no use of the Internet or technology, non-
technological methods, such as change of address and dumpster 
diving, were used in 20% of the cases.   
o  The limited number of cases opened in 2005 and 2006 prevented 
any trending analysis of Internet and technological use. 
•  The point of compromise for stealing personal identifying information or 
documents was determined in 274 of the cases. 
o  In 50% of those cases a business (service, retail, financial industry, 
corporation) provided the point of compromise or vulnerability. 
o  A family member or friend was the point of compromise in 
approximately 16% of the 274 cases. 
•  Approximately a third of the cases involved identity theft through 
employment.   
o  The most frequent type of employment from which personal 
identifying information or documents were stolen was retail (stores, 
car dealerships, gas stations, casinos, restaurants, hotels, 
hospitals, doctors offices) – 43.8% 
o  Private corporations were vulnerable to insider identity theft in 
about 20% of those cases.  
 
Victimization: 
 
Although most of the media attention surrounding identity theft and fraud has 
focused on individuals, they did not make up the largest percentage of victims in 
this study.   
•  Over a third (37.1%) of the victims were financial industry organizations: 
banks, credit unions, and credit card companies. 
• Individuals  accounted  for  34.3% of the victims. 
•  21.3% of the victims were retail businesses (stores, car dealerships, gas 
stations, casinos, restaurants, hotels, hospitals, doctors’ offices). 
•  Victimization of organizations took several forms: 
o  The financial services industry was most frequently victimized by 
offenders using fraudulently obtained personal identifying 
information to obtain new credit card accounts, to apply for and 
obtain fraudulent loans, to utter checks, and to transfer funds.   4
o  The retail industry was victimized by the use of stolen identity 
information to open store accounts and by purchasing merchandise 
with fraudulent credit cards. 
•  The data show that most individuals were victimized by individuals they 
did not know. 
o  59% of the victims did not know the offenders. 
o  10.5% of the victims were customers or clients of the offender. 
o  5% of the victims were related to the offender 
•  20.3% of the 939 offenders in the cases committed identity theft at their 
place of employment. 
o  Of those offenders, 59.7% were employed by a retail business. 
o  22.2% were employed by a financial services industry organization. 
 
The findings presented here must be used to improve and increase proactive 
measures that law enforcement and fraud investigators use to combat identity 
theft, including investigation, prevention, detection, and prosecution. The 
information concerning offender characteristics and modus operandi should be 
used in law enforcement training. The picture that this study paints of identity 
theft offenses and offenders should be used in prioritizing and managing cases 
and resources. Law enforcement executives will be able to use this information to 
develop policy, allocate resources, and advocate training.   
 
 
Recommendations 
 
The recommendations presented here are based on the use of the study’s 
empirical evidence. While conjecture and conventional wisdom may have led to 
some of the same conclusions in the past, this study allows law enforcement and 
corporate security leaders and policy makers to point to the data as a basis for 
implementing them. 
 
The data should be used to foster proactive investigation, detection,  prevention, 
and prosecution. 
• Recommendation  1:  Local and state law enforcement leaders should 
encourage more cooperation with federal law enforcement where it has 
begun and foster it where it is not occurring. 
• Recommendation  2:  Law enforcement at all levels should be aware of the 
offender characteristics and the role of identity theft in other crimes and 
apply that knowledge to their investigations. Law enforcement should 
continue to share the information they find with corporate entities, such as 
the financial services industry, so that prevention and detection strategies 
can be enhanced. 
• Recommendation  3:  The findings of this research study regarding federal 
and state statutes and disposition should be used as a basis on which to 
build policy and practice in prosecuting identity theft at all levels. 
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Law enforcement training programs will benefit from the knowledge gained from 
the empirical findings. 
• Recommendation  4:  The findings should be infused into the many fine 
existing training programs to move beyond assumptions and anecdotes 
and gain a greater understanding of identity theft. 
 
These findings provide the information law enforcement managers need to 
assign resources and prioritize cases. 
• Recommendation  5:  The findings of this study should be reviewed by law 
enforcement executives to gain a broader picture of where to focus their 
resources to combat identity theft.  
• Recommendation  6:  So that law enforcement agencies at all levels can 
share case information, collaborate on investigations, and better prioritize 
and manage their cases and resources, standardized case classifications 
should be established. Based on the empirical findings, consideration 
should be given to including identity theft as a primary classification code. 
 
Executive briefings will allow law enforcement executives to develop policy, 
allocate resources, and advocate training based on empirical research.   
• Recommendation  7:  A briefing on the research findings which will aid law 
enforcement executives in developing and implementing policies and 
procedures for investigation and prosecution of identity theft crimes should 
be made available.   
• Recommendation  8:  A briefing on the research findings which will provide 
law enforcement executives with cutting edge information to share with 
corporations should be made available. 
 
This study should be used as a model for a series of research studies. 
• Recommendation  9:  This model for research should be applied to cases 
held by local, state, and other federal law enforcement agencies.  
• Recommendation  10:  Building on the baseline created through this 
research, further longitudinal study of Secret Service closed cases with an 
identity theft component should be undertaken to determine trends and 
patterns of the crime in the near past and to anticipate future trends and 
areas of vulnerability. 
 
 
The authors anticipate that this groundbreaking study will make a difference in 
the prevention, detection, investigation, and mitigation of identity theft and fraud 
crimes. The empirical results regarding identity theft offenders and offenses will 
provide the basis for proactive procedures, policies, training, and management of 
resources. The continuation of this study to Secret Service cases that have 
closed since 2006 will allow the authors to complete trending analysis, so that 
predictions can be made and actions taken. 
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Introduction 
 
The purpose of this BJA funded project is to identify patterns and trends of 
identity theft, so that public law enforcement and private sector security 
departments will have added knowledge to apply to a proactive means of 
thwarting this insidious crime. While statistics and anecdotes abound regarding 
identity theft victims, there has been little research into the trends and patterns of 
the crime, characteristics of the offenders, and methods used by individual 
criminals, as well as organized crime activity. Societal perceptions about identity 
crimes are based on a combination of notorious case incidents, broadcast 
vignettes depicting the unfortunate experiences of the victims, media 
announcements cautioning against behavior that may precipitate victimization, 
and, quite often, word-of-mouth. This information can have a powerful impact on 
the manner in which the general public synthesizes the information and draws 
conclusions about the actual level of danger the crime poses to them. In other 
words, assumptions become reality. 
 
While no less than a decade ago “identity theft” was apt to be met with curiosity 
and some bewilderment, it has become one of the most recognizable crime 
terms of the 21
st century. Even so, questions remain regarding what it really 
represents, what type of person is most likely to commit this crime, what criminal 
methods are most commonly (and successfully) employed, and who is in most 
jeopardy of being victimized. In order to contain and prevent identity theft, these 
questions must be answered through an “empirical” approach, anchored in a 
thorough analysis of criminal justice system data.  
 
Law Enforcement and the Challenges Identity Theft Presents 
 
The United States Secret Service is actively involved in the investigation and 
prosecution of identity theft and fraud crimes. According to its website 
(www.secretservice.gov/criminal.shtml):  
 
Identity crimes are defined as the misuse of personal or financial 
identifiers in order to gain something of value and/or facilitate other 
criminal activity. The Secret Service is the primary federal agency tasked 
with investigating identity theft/fraud and its related activities under Title 
18, United States Code, Section 1028. Identity crimes are some of the 
fastest growing and most serious economic crimes in the United States for 
both financial institutions and persons whose identifying information has 
been illegally used. The Secret Service records criminal complaints, 
assists victims in contacting other relevant investigative and consumer 
protection agencies and works with other federal, state and local law 
enforcement and reporting agencies to identify perpetrators. 
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Similar information can be found on the websites of the United States Postal 
Inspection Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Federal Trade 
Commission, the Social Security Administration, the Department of Justice, many 
state police departments, several local police departments, and the numerous 
not-for-profit organizations devoted to combating identity theft and helping 
citizens to recover from it. Identity crimes are far reaching, as the attention given 
to it by government entities, the businesses that have emerged in an effort to 
thwart it, and the many stories from the media indicate.   
 
Statistics from Consumer Sentinel, the database of complaints maintained by the 
Federal Trade Commission, indicate that the highest percentage of complaints 
received in 2006 (36%) were concerning identity theft 
(http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2007/02/topcomplaints.shtm). Since 2001, the same has 
been true; the highest percentage of complaints received during each year 
concerned identity theft. President George Bush established the President’s Task 
Force on Identity Theft in May 2006 by Executive Order 13402. The Task Force 
report (April 2007, p. 1) states, “The problem of identity theft has become more 
complex and challenging to the general public, the government, and the private 
sector.”  While the Internet, with its chat rooms, electronic banking and 
payments, phishing and pharming, malware and Spyware, and pretexting, has 
certainly added a dimension to the crime, the basics are also still employed by 
identity thieves:  common theft, mail theft and change of address, dumpster 
diving, database and network hacking, and insider theft. The purposes for which 
identity thieves can use the stolen personal identifier information has been 
exacerbated by the Internet, as online credit applications, purchases, bank 
transfers, and the like eliminate the need for face to face contact. 
 
Law enforcement is, of course, faced with the challenges that the growing 
complexity of the crime presents. Those challenges are compounded by the lack 
of empirical data showing trends and patterns.  According to the FTC, in 2006 
62% of the identity theft victims who made reports on the FTC website did not 
notify a law enforcement agency. In a February 2005 article from The Police 
Chief, “Identity Theft and Police Response: Prevention,” the author, Ed Dadisho 
of the Los Angeles Police Department, states,  “Statistics on identity theft are 
useful for law enforcement agencies in many ways and can determine trends in 
suspect methodology, victim thought processes, and consolidation of resources 
to combat identity theft.” He goes on to say, “One of the most important ways to 
prevent identity theft is to educate police officers on the latest techniques to 
recognize during traffic stops and other detentions.”  
 
Such proactive strategies and training require knowledge gathered from research 
studies such as this one, in which closed United States Secret Service cases 
involving identity theft were studied and analyzed. For example, it is essential for 
law enforcement to understand the nature of identity thieves. The President’s 
Identity Task Force Report states, “Unlike some groups of criminals, identity 
thieves cannot be readily classified.  No surveys provide comprehensive data on   8
their primary personal or demographic characteristics.  For the most part, victims 
are not in a good position to know who stole their information or misused it” (April 
2007 p. 12).   
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Goals and Value of the Study 
 
The mission of this project is to use the compilation of study results as a 
compass by which law enforcers can navigate through the fog of past conjecture 
to proactively facilitate effective identity theft enforcement efforts. The analysis of 
the data will lead to a fuller realization of trends, patterns, and groups 
perpetrating identity theft. It is the first step toward what is meant to be a 
successive series of like endeavors gauging the evolution of identity theft as a 
distinct crime type. They will assist law enforcement administrators, at all 
government levels, in creating and implementing policies for effective 
investigation and prosecution of identity theft.   
 
The project was guided by four goals which were intended to provide the law 
enforcement community with the robust empirical information necessary to 
enhance identity theft control and prevention efforts.  
 
Goal: To explore and identify, from a national perspective, key identity theft 
offense, offender, and case characteristics. 
 
Goal: To collect and analyze criminal case data for the purpose of establishing 
an empirically-based profile of identity theft offense, offender, and case 
characteristics.  
 
Goal: To isolate those empirically obtained offense, offender and case factors 
that accurately represent the challenges to effective identity theft control and 
prevention. 
 
Goal: To convert the aggregation and analysis of identity theft crime case data 
into a substantive and formative guide to aid the successful control and 
prevention of identity theft. 
 
The findings of this study will provide reliable information that can be used to 
improve law enforcement methods. This project stands as an example of applied 
research in its truest sense, in that it is the planned collection and analysis of 
criminal justice data regarding identity theft in order to assist the law enforcement 
community in making informed decisions. The findings on offender 
characteristics, modus operandi, and the varied reactions of the criminal justice 
system to these offenses can sensitize law enforcement to early warning signs of 
the complexities of identity theft cases, preparing them for the investigative road 
ahead. This study supplies something to the law enforcement community that, 
heretofore, has not been available: a scientific presentation of the key factors 
relevant to the criminal behavior of identity theft and the conditions under which 
that behavior occurs. In the final analysis, the true worth of the study will be 
measured by the extent to which the consumers of the information maximize the 
findings to affect control of the commission of identity theft.    
   10
The Empirical Approach 
 
The primary aim of this project was to perform an exploratory quantitative and 
qualitative analysis of United States Secret Service closed cases to detect and 
synthesize identity theft patterns and trends. The researchers had no 
preconceived notions at the onset of the research, and did not test hypotheses. 
The process consisted of three steps: initial exploratory analysis of cases; 
iterative collection and analysis of the cases; and intensive data analysis to 
determine patterns.   
 
Identity Theft Definition 
 
In the report of the President’s Task Force on Identity Theft, identity theft is 
defined in this way, “Although identity theft is defined in many different ways, it is, 
fundamentally, the misuse of another individual’s personal information to commit 
fraud” (April 2007, p. 2). Although there is ongoing debate concerning the 
definition of identity theft, for the purposes of this study, the researchers agree 
with the Task Force definition, but consider personal information to be personal 
identifying information --  name, address, Social Security number, date of birth, 
which may be included on documents such as driver’s licenses and birth 
certificates. Access devices – credit cards, debit cards, ATM cards – are 
excluded. While the theft of a credit card may result in fraudulent charges, it does 
not result in the theft of an identity. The Task Force report agrees: “For example, 
a stolen credit card may lead to thousands of dollars in fraudulent charges, but 
the card generally would not provide the thief with enough information to 
establish a false identity” (p. 3). 
 
Source of Data 
 
The data for this study was collected from United States Secret Service closed 
cases with an identity theft component which were opened and closed between 
2000 and 2006. The staff at Secret Service headquarters selected the cases for 
the research team, based on the primary and secondary case codes that Secret 
Service uses to classify its cases. Seven hundred and thirty four cases were 
made available. The cases consisted of compilations of e-mail communications 
from the field office to headquarters, generally from one agent, throughout the 
duration of the case. The research team, working at Secret Service Headquarters 
in Washington, D.C., collected data on 517 of these, as the other 217 were 
excluded (see below).   
 
Elements Collected 
 
The researchers independently reviewed several of the same cases to determine 
which elements were of importance.  They then came to consensus on the 
elements, based on the goals of the study and the available data. The elements   11
were categorized and arranged in a template to assure uniformity in data 
collection. (See Appendix A.) 
 
As the cases focused on the offenders and the offense, the team chose several 
demographic and characteristic elements, including sex, race, date of birth, place 
of birth, and criminal history. The characteristics of the offense included the 
Secret Service classification and region, the actual loss, jurisdiction, statutes 
violated, disposition, the way in which the case was referred to the United States 
Secret Service, and details of the case including a summary of the file’s case 
notes, the defendants’ roles and relationships to the victim, the methods used, 
the number of defendants (including organized group activity), the geographical 
scope, and the victim, i.e. individual, government agency, etc.   
 
Data Analysis 
 
Upon completion of the collection phase, the data was inputted into statistical 
analysis software. The initial univariant analysis was studied and discussed by 
the research team to discern significant findings and determine further detailed 
analysis. The process was repeated so that patterns and trends could be 
discerned and useful information could be provided for law enforcement and 
corporate security organizations. The summaries of the agent’s case notes were 
studied using content analysis tools. As initial content analysis was completed, it 
was discussed to determine further analysis. 
 
Excluded Cases 
 
29.6%  per cent of the 734 cases available to the team were determined to be 
outside the definitional scope of this study. The factors used to exclude a case 
were: 
 
•  Existing account fraud:  The team determined before beginning data 
collection that cases which dealt solely with existing account fraud where 
personal identifying information was not used would be eliminated.  The 
President’s Task Force Report defines existing account fraud as follows, 
“This occurs when thieves obtain account information involving credit, 
brokerage, banking, or utility accounts which are already open” (April 
2007, p. 3). 
•  No discernible connection to identity theft.  
•  Cases that were opened before 2000. 
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Data Limitations 
 
The data used in this study was collected from Secret Service cases related to 
identity theft that were opened and closed between January 2000 and March 
2007 and made available to the research team. These cases were referred to 
and accepted by the Secret Service during that time period. This data does not 
represent all of the identity theft cases that were investigated and prosecuted 
during this time period by the Secret Service and other law enforcement 
agencies. The characteristics of cases that were not referred to and/or accepted 
by the Secret Service, but investigated by local or state law enforcement or 
another federal entity (e.g. USPIS, FBI), may differ, as may conclusions drawn 
from them concerning trends and patterns. However, the differences may not be 
great and the findings of this study should be applied to state and local law 
enforcement efforts. The researchers recognize that there is an unknown figure 
of identity theft crimes. 
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 Findings 
 
The data collected has been separated into four categories: the case, the 
offenders, the commission of the crime, and victimization. The variables within 
each are reported and explained in this section. 
 
The following characteristics of the case were examined: 
 
  The way in which the Secret Service classified the case 
  The distribution of the cases among the Secret Service regions 
  The way in which the case was referred to the Secret Service  
  The jurisdiction under which the cases fell 
  The federal and state statutes that were violated 
  The disposition of the case:  incarceration, probation, restitution 
  The actual dollar loss 
  The timing and duration of the cases 
  The geographical scope: local, state, interstate, international 
 
The offender characteristics analyzed were: 
 
 Demographics 
o Gender 
o Age 
o Race 
 Arrest  History 
o  Types of offenses 
 Motivating  Factors 
 
In analyzing the commission of the crime, the following characteristics were 
studied: 
 
  Offenses facilitated by identity thefts 
  Individual activity versus group activity and the roles the offenders took 
  Offender Methods:  Internet, technological, and non-technological 
o  Utilization of methods by offenders 
o Patterns 
  Point of Compromise 
 
Victimization characteristics included: 
 
  The victims: organizations and individuals 
  Methods of victimization (other than individuals) 
  Offender relationship to individual victims 
  Identity theft through employment 
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The Case 
 
Secret Service Case Classification 
 
The Secret Service classifies its cases by primary and secondary code types. 
Each case is assigned one primary code when it is opened, based on the initial 
facts of the case.  As the case evolves, secondary case codes are added. The 
agent in charge of the case and the office manager determine what codes to 
assign.  When the case is sent to Secret Service headquarters, the 
classifications are reviewed and adjusted if necessary.  
 
Figure 1 displays the most frequent primary case types represented by the 517 
cases.  Fifty per cent of the cases were classified as Fraudulent Use of Account 
Numbers, Fraudulent Access Device Applications, Stolen Bank Issued Cards, 
Financial Institution Fraud (FIF) Involving Check Fraud, Counterfeit Bank Issued 
Credit Cards, Counterfeit Commercial Checks, and Counterfeit State Driver’s 
licenses.  A quarter of the cases (listed as other) were of primary code types 
ranging from altered documents to other counterfeit documents to various types 
of financial institution fraud. 
 
 
Figure 1. Most Frequent Primary Case Type
78 15.1
58 11.2
36 7.0
35 6.8
34 6.6
27 5.2
23 4.4
22 4.3
19 3.7
15 2.9
14 2.7
12 2.3
11 2.1
133 25.7
517 100.0
       Primary Case Type Description
Fraudulent use of account number
Fraudulent access device
Stolen Bank issued cards
All other cases involving FIF* investigation
FIF* involving check fraud
Counterfeit Bank issued card
Counterfeit commercial checks
Counterfeit State Driver Licence
Fraudulently obtained Genuine ID/Social Security Card
Manufacturing commercial/counterfeit check
Account takeover access/bank card
Stolen/Forged commercial/personal check
Fraudulent retail business card application
All Others
Total
Frequency Percent
*FIF=Financial Institution Fraud
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Figure 2 shows the most frequent secondary case types.  The numbers exceed 
the total number of cases because more than one secondary case type can be 
assigned to a case.  Identity Fraud, which the Secret Service defines as the 
misuse of personal or financial identifiers for personal gain or to facilitate other 
criminal activity, was listed as a secondary case type in 87.2% (451) of the 517 
cases.  Significant Community Impact, which was a secondary code in 51.5% of 
the cases, is based on the number of people and/or accounts that are involved 
and the potential impact of the crime. 
 
Figure 2. Most Frequent Secondary Case Type
451 87.2
264 51.5
163 31.5
100 19.3
70 13.5
67 12.9
60 11.6
49 9.5
46 8.9
40 7.7
37 7.2
37 7.2
30 5.8
24 4.6
24 4.6
20 3.9
18 3.5
8 1.5
8 1.5
       Secondary Case Type Description
Identity Fraud
Significant Commuity Impact
Crimes Involving Use of Evolving Technology
Domestic Multi-District
Counterfeit State Drivers Licenses
All Other Non-Prioritization Investigations
Organized Crime Groups
All Other Task Forces
Fraudulent Use of Account Numbers
Fraudulent Access Device Applications
Electronic Crimes Task Force
Financial Crimes Task Force
Fraudulent Retail Business Card Applications
Transnational Criminal Activity
Fraudulently Obtained Genuine ID
Conterfeit Social Security Cards
Stolen Bank Issued Cards
Counterfeit Bank Issued Credit Cards
Drug Related (Non-Task Force)
Frequency Percent
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Secret Service Regions 
 
Each of the cases was housed in a regional or field office. These offices are in 
one of four regions designated by the Secret Service. Region 1 encompasses the 
Northeastern United States, Europe, Russia, and South Africa. Region 2 is 
comprised of the Midwest United States and Canada. The Southern United 
States, South America, and Central America make up Region 3. The 4
th region 
includes the Western United States and Far East. Figure 3 shows that of the 517 
cases, 35.2% (182) were from Secret Service field offices in Region 1, the 
Northeastern United States (180) and Europe (2).  28.8% (149) came from 
Secret Service field offices in the Southern United States. Eighty eight of the 
cases were from Secret Service field offices in the Midwestern United States and 
five were from Canada, for a total of 18% from Region 2. The cases from the 
Western United States (93), Region 4, made up18% of the total. None of those 
was from the Far East. 
   
 
N=517
                       Figure 3: Secret Service Regions
.
. Region 1
182
Region 2
93
Region 3
149
Region 4
93
Western U.S.
(18&) Northeastern U.S.
(35.2%)
Southern U.S.
(28.8%)
Midwest U.S.
(18%)
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Case Referral 
 
In each case file, the way in which the case was referred to the Secret Service 
was identified. The Secret Service was brought in through several channels, 
categorized as follows: 
 
 Victim 
  Individual other than the victim 
o  Includes anonymous tip, attorney, defendant turning himself in, 
confidential informant, private investigator, witness 
  Local or state law enforcement agencies 
o  Includes local and county police departments, local and county 
sheriff’s offices, state police, district or state attorney 
 Federal  agencies 
o  Includes Secret Service headquarters, field or regional offices, FBI, 
DEA, ATF, etc. 
 Task  forces 
o Counterfeit  Crimes 
o  Economic and Identity Crimes 
o Electronic  Crimes 
o Financial  Crimes 
o Identity  Theft 
o Organized  Crime 
  Private sector security/fraud investigation 
o  Includes card processors, corporations, credit card companies, 
financial institutions, nursing homes, retail establishments, small 
business, higher education 
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Figure 4 shows that the largest percentage of the cases was referred to the 
Secret Service by local or state law enforcement: 246 cases or 47.6%. The 
identity theft or fraud was discovered during a routine traffic stop in 20 of those 
cases.  (This may also have been the case in many of the others; the case files 
did not always indicate how law enforcement became involved.) The next most 
frequent referral is from private sector security and/or fraud investigations: 20.3% 
(105). 14.3% (74) of the cases were referred from other federal agencies.  Within 
that category, 29 of the cases were brought to the Secret Service by the United 
States Postal Inspection Service. In 10.6% of the cases (55), the victim contacted 
the Secret Service directly. 
 
N=517
Figure 4. Referral to Secret Service
Missing
(0.6%)
Task Forces
Individual Other than Victim
3
Federal Agency Victim
16
(3.1%)
State or Local Enforcement
74 (14.3%)
246 (47.8%)
55 (10.6%)
18
(3.5%)
Private Sector Security/
Fraud Investigatiion
105 (20.3%)
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Case Referral:  Local Law Enforcement 
In this case from Region 2 (Midwest U.S.) the defendant was involved in a car 
accident. During the accident investigation, counterfeit personal checks, 
counterfeit identification, and a computer disk containing templates for U.S. 
Treasury checks, IRS refund checks, Social Security cards, and state drivers 
licenses were found. The detective from the local police department notified the 
Secret Service Financial Crimes Task Force. When interviewed, the defendant 
admitted that he had used the computer to commit several crimes. He obtained a 
LexisNexis account number from an attorney friend and used it to obtain Social 
Security numbers. He said he “hacked” into a military site where he accessed 
over 100 Social Security numbers. He made counterfeit Social Security cards 
and sold them to illegal immigrants. He used counterfeit bank checks and false 
identification to purchase a vehicle. The case was tried under state jurisdiction 
using a statute related to the interstate transportation of stolen property. The 
defendant, who had no arrest history, was sentenced to two years of 
incarceration and three years of probation.   20
Jurisdiction 
 
The jurisdiction of each case was dependent on the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the 
area.  Each office has guidelines for cases it will prosecute. Secret Service cases 
often start as state cases, but as the investigation evolves, they meet the 
thresholds for a federal case and the state charges are dropped. As shown in 
Figure 5, the jurisdiction for the majority of the cases was federal:  320 out of 499 
(64.1%). Individual states had jurisdiction in 30.9% (154) of the cases; 3.8% (19) 
were a combination of state and federal; and the jurisdiction of 6 cases (1.2%) 
was outside the United States. In 18 cases, the jurisdiction was not made 
available. Of the 320 cases with federal jurisdiction, 41.8% (134) were referred to 
the Secret Service from local or state law enforcement. Ninety two (59.7%) of the 
state jurisdiction cases were referred from local or state law enforcement.  In 
many of these cases, victims were in one state and offenders in another.   
 
N=499*
Figure 5. Case Jurisdiction
*18  cases are excluded.
Federal State Federal and State Foreign
0
100
200
300 320
(64.1%)
154
(30.9%)
19
(3.8%) 6
(1.2%)
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Federal Statutes Violated 
 
While in the past, identity theft cases were more apt to be prosecuted using mail 
and wire fraud statutes, Figure 6 shows that within the cases under federal and 
federal and state jurisdiction (339), federal statute 18 USC 1029 -- Fraud and 
related activity in connection with access devices -- was violated 161 times. 
Federal statute 18 USC 1028 -- Fraud and related activity in connection with 
identification documents, authentication features, and information – was violated 
133 times. This may indicate that prosecutors have become more willing to use 
these relatively new statutes. It should be noted that in most cases, more than 
one statute was violated, though not all were charged, and that more than one 
statute under the larger designation, such as 18 USC 1029, may have been 
violated. Seventy eight of the violations were of 18 USC 1344 – Bank Fraud.  
Misuse of Social Security Number, 42 USC 408(a)(7)(B), was noted in 49 of the 
cases.  
 
                          Figure 6. Most Frequently Violated Federal Statutes
Access Device Fraud 161
ID Fraud 133
Bank Fraud 78
Misuse of SSN 49
Conspiracy to Commit Access Device Fraud 44
Mail Fraud 28
Wire Fraud 28
18 USC 1029
18 USC 1028
18 USC 1344
42 USC 408 (a) (7) (B)
18 USC 371
18 USC 1341
18 USC 1343
            N
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State Statutes Violated 
 
In the 173 cases that came under state jurisdiction or federal and state 
jurisdiction, several statutes in each state were violated. These statutes were 
placed into 15 categories, as shown in Figure 7. As with the federal statutes, in 
many cases more than one statute was violated and more than one statute within 
each category could be charged. The most frequent type of state statute violated 
was identity theft/fraud, followed by theft/larceny/stolen property and forgery.  
Credit card fraud statutes were violated 55 times. Statutes in these four 
categories were violated a total of 267 times. 
 
Figure 7. Most Frequently Violated State Statutes
82
69
61
55
17
13
11
10
10
7
6
6
6
4
2
Identity Theft/Fraud
Theft/Larceny/Stolen Property
Forgery
Credit Card Fraud
Bank/Check Fraud
Unspecified Fraud
Conspiracy/RICO
Criminal Impersonation
Drugs
Counterfeiting
Computer Crime
Miscellaneous
Tampering
Weapons
Assault, Violent Crimes
              N
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Disposition 
 
Dispositions included incarceration, probation, restitution, and fines. There were 
933 defendants in the 517 cases in this study. Four hundred and seventy nine 
(51.3%) of the defendants received a sentence of incarceration; however, the 
term of incarceration was not collected for 43 individuals. The majority of 
defendants whose sentences were known (54.8%) received a sentence of 24 
months or less, as shown in Figure 8. Of the 479 defendants sentenced to 
incarceration, 67.4% (323) were federally prosecuted; 26.7% (128) were 
prosecuted under state jurisdiction. Five percent (24) were prosecuted using both 
federal and state statutes; .8% (4) received incarceration in a foreign jurisdiction. 
These percentages align with the percentage of cases that fell under each 
jurisdiction. 
 
N=436*
Figure 8. Months of Incarceration
* 43 unspecified cases are excluded
Upto 12
28.9%
13 to 24
25.9%
25 to36
16.3%
37 to 48
12.4%
49 to 60
6.0%
61 to 72
2.5%
Over 72
8.0%  24
 
Federal Jurisdiction, 18 USC 1028 and 1029, Incarceration 
In this case, which was referred to the Dallas, Texas field office by a local police 
department, the defendant confessed to stealing personal identifier information 
from members of the athletic club where he worked. Using the information, he 
produced counterfeit identification document on his home computer and opened 
numerous credit accounts. He purchased merchandise with the fraudulent 
accounts and sold it to friends at a discount. His arrest history included 
misdemeanor theft and possession of marijuana. He was charged with both 18 
USC 1028 and 1029 and was sentenced to 15 months incarceration, 36 months 
probation, and $54,720 in restitution. 
 
Four hundred and eighty (51.4%) defendants received a sentence of probation; 
the term was not collected for three of them. Figure 9 depicts the range of 
probation sentences and the frequency. Of the known probation sentences, the 
majority 60.6 % (289) received a 25 to 36 month probation term. 21.8 % (104) of 
the defendants received a probation sentence between 37 and 60 months. A 
small percentage, 1.5 %, (7) received over 60 months. The remainder (16.4%, 
77) received a sentence of up to 24 months.   
N=477*
Figure 9. Months of Probation
*3 unspecified cases are excluded
Upto 24
16.10%
25 to 36
60.60%
37 to 60
21.80%
Over 60
1.50%
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In most cases, those sentenced to incarceration also received a period of 
probation. Three hundred and eleven, or 65%, of the 479 defendants who 
received incarceration were also given probation. One hundred and sixty nine 
defendants (18%) were sentenced to probation with no incarceration. 
 
Three hundred and sixty one (38.7%) of the 933 defendants were ordered to pay 
restitution. In most cases, the amount of the restitution was congruent with the 
reported actual loss. Figure 10 illustrates the restitution ranges and the frequency 
in each grouping. One hundred and fifty six of those (43.2%) who received 
restitution sentences were required to pay less than $20,000. 
 
Figure 10. Restitution
97 26.9%
59 16.3%
45 12.5%
34 9.4%
16 4.4%
16 4.4%
14 3.9%
2 .6%
9 2.5%
4 1.1%
65 18.0%
361 100.0%
Up to 10,000
10,001 to 20,000
20,001 to 30,000
30,001 to 40,000
40,001 to 50,000
50,001 to 60,000
60,001 to 70,000
70,001 to 80,000
80,001 to 90,000
90,001 to 100,000
Over 100,000
Total
               N      Percent
 
 
 
 
Two hundred and twenty four defendants were sentenced to both incarceration 
and probation and were required to pay restitution. In some cases, defendants 
received probation and restitution. In a few, the defendant’s only sentence was 
restitution. 
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Actual Loss 
 
The amount of loss caused by the cases varied greatly, from no dollar loss in 34 
to $13,000,000 in one case. In 47 cases, the actual loss was not available to the 
researchers. The median loss among the cases was $31,356. As shown in 
Figure 11, the actual loss varied with the number of defendants in the case. The 
median loss in cases where the offender worked alone was $22,526. That figure 
rose to $42,710 in cases with two defendants, and to $84,439 in cases with 5.   
 
Figure 11. Number of Defendants and Actual Loss*
Actual $ Loss
268 57.0% $22,526
109 23.2% $42,710
37 7.9% $31,532
18 3.8% $48,547
17 3.6% $84,439
21 4.5% $150,000
470 100.0% $31,356
# of Defendants
1
2
3
4
5
6 or more
Total
          N  % of Total N         Median
*47 unknown cases are excluded
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Actual Loss:  the Extremes 
In a case representative of a zero dollar loss, a Houston area task force was 
contacted by a bank fraud investigator concerning an employee of the bank who 
was involved in a fraudulent transaction. The bank employee, the single 
defendant in the case, applied for and received a loan in another individual’s 
name. When the car dealership refused the loan check because it was not made 
out in the defendant’s name, he attempted to deposit it into his account at the 
bank where he was an assistant manager. He had applied for the loan online, 
using the victim’s Social Security number, date of birth, and home and work 
phones.  The defendant changed the victim’s first name from Jane to Jan, and 
used his own address and utility bill.  The victim was unaware of the car loan, but 
knew that someone had attempted to apply for a credit card using her personal 
identifiers. 
 
In the case where the actual loss was $13,000,000, a bank investigator 
contacted the Dallas Secret Service field office concerning a case of identity theft 
related to bank fraud. The defendant, acting alone, used false information about 
his identity and financial status to receive millions of dollars of loans to purchase 
luxury vehicles. He used the identity of a person serving life in prison for several 
of these, as well as to open credit accounts and buy two houses. He also used 
the identities of incarcerated individuals to establish several shell companies and 
attract investors, whom he subsequently defrauded. 
 
Timing of Cases 
 
For the purposes of this study, case duration is defined as the time between the 
dates that the case was opened and closed by the Secret Service. Figure 12 
shows that the duration for the majority of the cases was two years or less – 365 
of 517 cases or 70.6%.  Figure 13 shows that most of the cases in the study 
were opened in 2002 (30.4%,156) and 2003 (25.7%,132).  
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N=517
Figure 12. Case Duration
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N=514*
Figure 13. Year the Case Opened
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9
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Geographical Scope 
 
Data was collected concerning the geographic range of the cases. If the 
offenders and their victims were located in one place, such as a metropolitan 
area, the case was considered “local.” If they operated in several cities and 
towns within one state, the designation was “within state.” “Interstate” was for 
cases in which the offenders operated in more than one state or in which the 
offenders were in one state or states and the victims in another state or states.  
In “international” cases the offense reached from the United States to another 
country. As shown in Figure 14, the cases were fairly evenly divided among local, 
state, and interstate. 
 
N=517
Figure 14. Geographical Scope
Local
173
Within state
136
Interstate
181
International
27(5.2%)
(33.5%)
(35%)
(26.3%)
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The Case in Summary 
 
Based on the findings, a typical closed Secret Service case involving identity 
theft was referred to a field or regional office in Region 1 (Northeastern United 
States and Europe) by local or state law enforcement. The case was opened in 
2002 or 2003 and closed within two years, and its geographical scope was local 
or interstate. The case’s primary classification was Fraudulent Use of Account 
Numbers, with a secondary classification of Identity Theft.  The jurisdiction was 
federal and either 18 USC 1029 or 18 USC 1028 was violated.  The actual loss 
was $20,000 or less.  At least one defendant was convicted and given a 
sentence including incarceration of 24 months or less, probation of 2 -3 years, 
and restitution less than $20,000.  The following case illustrates this, with the 
exception of the referral to the Secret Service. 
 
 
A “Typical” Case 
The victim contacted the Newark, New Jersey field office in August 2002. He 
reported that he had received numerous credit card account statements from 
retail stores, none of which he had authorized. The case’s primary classification 
was Fraudulent Use of Account Numbers. One of the secondary classifications 
was Identity Fraud. The defendant had purchased a birth certificate and W-2 
form in the name of the victim. He used those to obtain a duplicate driver’s 
license, which he used to open store credit card accounts in the local area. The 
actual loss was $13,175. The case fell under federal jurisdiction. The defendant 
pled guilty to charges of 18 USC 1029(a)(2), Access Device Fraud, and was 
sentenced to 18 months in prison, 3 years of probation, and ordered to pay 
$13,175 in restitution. The case was closed in March 2004. 
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The Offenders 
 
In order to gain a greater understanding of the type of individual who is likely to 
commit identity theft, data collected on the offender included gender, race, age at 
the time the Secret Service case was opened, and place of birth. Information was 
also gathered from the files concerning arrest history and the types of prior 
offenses, and motivating factors.  
 
Gender, Race, Age, Place of Birth 
 
Within the 517 cases included in this study, there were 933 defendants or 
offenders. As Figure 15 indicates, 67.4% (627) of the offenders were male.  
Females accounted for a sizable minority of 32.6% (303).The gender of three of 
the offenders was not made available.  Also included in Figure 15 is the 
distribution of age, race, and whether or not the defendant had an arrest history. 
The age statistics are based on the age of the defendant during the year in which 
the case was opened. Information on the age of 116 offenders was not made 
available. The largest percentage of offenders – 42.5% -- were between 25 and 
34 years of age (347). The 35 – 49 age group made up 33% of the offenders 
(270). 18.5% (151) were between 18 and 24 years old.  The remaining 6% (49) 
were 50 years old or older.   
 
The majority of the offenders were black: 53.8% (467). White offenders 
accounted for 38.3% (332).  4.8% (42) of the offenders were Hispanic and 3.1% 
(27) were Asian. The race for 65 of the offenders was not made available. 
 
Information on arrest history was available for 922 of the defendants.  Most of 
them – 71% (655) did not have any prior arrest history, while 29% (267) did. 
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Figure 15. Characteristics of Offenders
Percent
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67.4%
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100%*
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100%*
29%
71%
100%*
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933
Total
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303
Subtotal 930a
Female
Gender
151 18-24
347 25-34
270 35-49
42 50-64
7
Subtotal 817b
65 or older
Age
332 White
467 Black
42 Hispanic
27 Asian
Subtotal  868c
Race
267 Yes
655
Subtotal 922d
No
Arrest
* % calculation in each variable excludes unknown cases
3 unknown due to various reasons a. 
116 unknown due to various reasons b. 
65 unknown due to various reasons c. 
11 unknown due to various reasons d. 
 
 
 
 
  
Information on the offenders’ place of birth was available for 660 offenders. While 
a clear majority of these offenders was born in the United States, almost one 
quarter (24.1%, 159) were not.  The top five countries represented were Mexico 
(21), Nigeria (20), the United Kingdom (12), Cuba (11), and Israel (7).   
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Figure 16 shows that there is a relationship between race and gender among the 
offenders. Most of the female offenders were black 61.6% (172). 30.8% (86) 
were white. Of all white offenders, 25.9% were female, as opposed to the black 
offenders where 36.9% were female. The distribution of blacks and whites 
among male offenders was more even – 41.8% (246) of the males were white; 
50% (294) were black. 
 
 
Figure 16. Race by Gender
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A more detailed analysis provides some insight into the age at which females are 
involved in identity theft, as shown in Figure 17. Females tend to demonstrate 
greater identity theft activity at younger ages than men do. 51.9% (137) of all the 
females were between 25 and 34 years old in the year the case was opened, 
while only 38% (210) of the males fell into that age bracket. About the same 
percentage of males – 36.5% (202) were between the ages of 35 and 49 at the 
time the case was opened, as opposed to 25.8% (68) of the females who were in 
that age grouping. 
 
Figure 17. Age by Gender
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Figure 18 shows the relationship between race and age. In the first two age 
categories, 18-24 and 25-34, the percentages of whites and blacks are 
representative of the total percentage of black and white defendants. Within the 
18-24 age group, among the defendants for whom both race and age was 
known, 50.7% were black and 37.3% were white. The percentages are similar in 
the next category: 25 – 34, 55.5% black, 36% white. In the next two categories, 
the percentage of whites is higher than the percentage of all white offenders: 35 
– 49, 52.4% black, 40.9% white; 50 – 64, 40.5% black, 54.8% white.  
 
 
Figure 18. Age by Race
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Arrest History 
 
Defendant arrest history information was available for 859 of the 922 defendants.  
Within that number, the majority, 71%, had no previous history. As shown in 
Figure 19, the racial breakdown of the 29.9% with prior arrests is of interest.  
Although Hispanic offenders made up only 4.9% (42) of the offenders, 42.9% of 
them had previous arrests. 25.5% Of white offenders had previous arrests, as did  
32.8% of the black offenders.  
 
Figure 19. Race by Arrest
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Offenders with criminal histories tended to have committed fraud related crimes 
or property offenses. As shown in Figure 20, of the 595 previous arrests noted in 
the case files, 33.2% (197) were for fraud, forgery, or identity theft or fraud.  
26.6% (158) were for theft/larceny. The previous arrests were for violent crimes 
in only 12.6% (75) and for drug offenses in only 9.4% (56).  
 
Figure 20. Arrest Type
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Motivating Factors  
 
The data collection included a paragraph summary or synopsis of the case, 
based on the description of the investigation in the files, for 503 of the cases. 
These summaries provided information about the factors which motivated the 
offenders to commit the offense that provided them with fraudulently obtained or 
fictitious personally identifying information. In most of the cases there was more 
than one motive. Figure 21 shows the frequency and percentage of the eight 
most prevalent motives for committing identity theft or fraud.  
 
Figure 21:  Motivating Factors 
Motive Number  Percentage 
Use stolen ID to obtain and 
use credit  228  45.3% 
Use stolen ID to procure cash  166  33% 
Use stolen ID to conceal 
actual identity  114 22.7% 
Use stolen ID to apply for 
loans to buy vehicles  105  20.9% 
Use stolen ID to manufacture 
and sell fraudulent IDs  39  7.7% 
Use stolen ID to obtain cell 
phones and services  23 4.6% 
Use stolen ID to gain 
government benefits  19  3.8% 
Use stolen ID to procure drugs  11  2.2% 
 
Use stolen or fraudulent ID to obtain and use credit:  This includes using stolen 
identification documents and information, fraudulent and altered identity 
documents, counterfeit credit cards and identity documents, fictitious identity 
information, and fraudulently obtained credit cards to obtain credit, obtain access 
to credit card accounts or open credit accounts, and use them to make 
purchases.  As shown in Figure 21, this was a motive in 45.3% (228) of the 
cases. 
 
Use stolen ID to procure cash:  This includes opening bank accounts, uttering 
counterfeit checks, transferring funds between and among accounts, and uttering 
forged or stolen checks using stolen or fraudulent identification documents.  
Obtaining cash was a motivating factor in 33% (166) of the cases. 
 
Use stolen ID to conceal actual identity:  This includes purchasing fraudulent ID 
documents or stealing them to hide ones’ true identity, to gain employment, to   39
conceal credit history, and to obtain “new” identity documents.  This motive 
occurred in 22.7% (114) of the cases. 
 
Use stolen ID to apply for loans to buy vehicles:  In 20.9% (105) of the cases, the 
offenders used fraudulently obtained personally identifying information to apply 
for loans, obtain loans, and purchase motor vehicles. 
 
Use stolen ID to manufacture and sell fraudulent IDs:  The business of providing 
fraudulent identification documents for profit was a motive in 7.7% (39) of the 
cases.  The offenders manufactured and sold driver’s licenses and Social 
Security cards, often to match stolen credit cards.  They sold counterfeit and 
fraudulent identification documents, credit card numbers, and fraudulently 
obtained personally identifying information. 
 
Use stolen ID to obtain cell phones and services: Fraudulently obtained 
personally identifying information was used to open cellular phone accounts and 
procure services in 4.6% (23) of the cases. 
 
Use stolen ID to gain government benefits:  Offenders used fraudulently obtained 
personally identifying information to collect entitlement payments and to file 
income tax returns to get refunds in 3.8% (19) of the cases. 
 
Use stolen ID to procure drugs:  In 2.2% (11) of the cases, drugs were a 
motivating factor.  The offenders used stolen identity information in some way to 
get the cash to support their drug addictions. 
 
It is clear that the primary motive of the offenders in these cases was financial 
gain. With the possible exceptions of using the fraudulent information to conceal 
actual identity and to obtain cell phones and services, all of these motives point 
to a need or desire for money. Some of the offenders were involved in 
perpetuating the offenses as a profitable business. Others simply wanted the 
ability to purchase a car or other merchandise or pay their bills. In some cases, 
drug addicts used identity theft offenses as a means of supporting their habits. 
 
Motivating Factor: Supporting a Drug Habit 
In this case, which was opened in 2003, the three defendants worked together to 
steal mail from mailboxes in suburban towns when they needed money to 
support their methamphetamine habit. They looked for mail containing 
government, payroll, and personal checks and personal identifiers. One 
defendant used his computer to produce counterfeit state driver’s licenses, Social 
Security cards, and counterfeit checks. Each of the defendants was sentenced to 
incarceration and probation. 
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An Identity Theft Offender in Summary 
 
It seems, based on the Secret Service case data, that the characteristics of an 
identity theft offender are complex. There is considerable diversity among race, 
age, gender, and criminal background. There were more black offenders than 
white. A third of the offenders were women and were younger than their male 
counterparts. Overall, the offenders in the examined cases were born in the 
United States, but it is difficult to ignore the fact that close to one quarter were 
not. And while most of these offenders show no evidence of arrests for prior 
offenses, those who do demonstrate a clear past participation in like crimes: 
fraud and other property-related offenses.  The overriding motive was financial 
gain. 
 
Identity Theft Offenders 
In this case two of the defendants were black females and two were black males. 
There were between the ages 25 and 29 at the time the case was opened. They 
all had prior records, including forgery, narcotics violations, assault, weapons 
possession, and obtaining property via false pretenses. The two females directed 
the activities of the other two. In an effort to procure cash, the younger woman 
produced and passed counterfeit checks, using a fraudulent driver’s license in 
another woman’s name, searched the Internet for routing numbers for local 
banks and made up account numbers. 
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The Commission of the Crime   
 
Offenses Facilitated by Identity Theft 
 
Although 517 cases were studied, there were more than that number of offenses, 
as more than one offense could be committed within each case. Therefore, data 
was collected concerning 1093 offenses that were facilitated by identity theft. In 
almost every case, a situation presented itself which allowed the offender to 
commit crimes by taking advantage of an opportunity or vulnerability. Figure 22 
illustrates the types of crimes which identity theft facilitated.  
 
 
Figure 22. Offenses Facilitated by ID Theft
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The most frequent offense that was committed through or with identity theft was 
fraud. It occurred in 87% of the cases, accounting for 39.9% (436) of the total 
offenses. This is not surprising, as a component of identity theft is fraudulent 
behavior, such as opening new accounts using another individual’s personal 
identifying information. Larceny/theft was the next most frequent, as once new 
accounts are opened, the offender uses the money or credit to acquire 
merchandise or services, therefore stealing from the institutions (bank, retail) 
and/or the individual. It was a component of 74.9% of the cases, occurring 375 
times. Forgery/counterfeiting was part of 41.5% of the cases, and constituted 
19.0% (208) of the total offenses.  Again, this is to be expected, as counterfeiting 
includes producing fraudulent identity documents, based on stolen personal 
identifying information. The other offenses listed occurred much less frequently.  
Credit card skimming, family offenses, and Internet and telephone scams are 
included in “Other.”  
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Insider Identity Theft 
 
By and large, these offenses were not perpetrated by insiders (e.g., employees 
of entities housing the identity information/documents stolen). In 65.9% (341) of 
the cases, the offenses were not committed through the employment of the 
offenders, while the point of vulnerability was the offenders’ place of employment 
in 34.1% (176).  Identity theft through employment, as shown in Figure 23, 
occurred most often among offenders employed in the retail industry – stores, 
gas stations, car dealerships, casinos, restaurants, hospitals, doctors’ offices, 
hotels, and the like. Offenders stole personal identifier information from these 
places of employment in 77 cases – 43.8% of the cases involving identity theft 
through employment. It occurred 36 times in private companies (20.5%). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23.  Identity Theft at Types of Employment
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Identity Theft through Employment 
The defendant was employed by a cleaning service (service industry) and 
cleaned the victim’s residence.  While on the job, he stole the brokerage account 
number belonging to the victim’s company and through telephone transfer, using 
the victim’s date of birth and Social Security number, had $80,000 placed in a 
bank account.  He later withdrew it, placed it in another bank account, and used 
the money to purchase a vehicle.  The victim was on an airplane at the time of 
the call requesting the transfer. He became aware of the fund transfer when the 
brokerage called him to confirm the transaction. 
 
Individual Activity vs. Organized Group Activity: Roles 
 
The data collected from the Secret Service cases included the number of 
defendants and the roles which they played in the commission of the crime.  The 
roles the defendants took were: 
 
  Steal or obtain personal identifying information (e.g. personal identifying 
information that could be captured from credit card databases, client and 
employee records, credit card receipts, bank statements, stolen mail, 
checks) 
  Steal or obtain personal identifier documents (e.g. driver’s licenses, birth 
certificates, Social Security cards, employee badges) 
  Steal or obtain bank cards (credit, debit, ATM) 
  Alter identification documents (e.g. driver’s licenses, Social Security cards, 
birth certificates, employee badges) 
  Produce counterfeit identification documents (e.g. driver’s licenses, Social 
Security cards, birth certificates, employee identification cards) 
  Distribute personal identifier information to others (so that they could use it 
for personal gain) 
  Sell identification documents (genuine and counterfeit) 
  Use identification documents for own use (The offender used genuine or 
counterfeit documents for his or her own personal gain.) 
  Use identification documents to obtain more identification documents (e.g. 
using a utility bill and birth certificate to procure a driver’s license) 
  Direct others’ activities (within an organized crime group, giving 
instructions or orders to the others in the group) 
  Other (includes credit card skimming, encoding or re-encoding bank 
cards) 
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It is clear that the majority of the 517 cases involved a single offender,  As Figure 
24 shows, 57.6% (298) of the cases were ones in which there was only one 
defendant. In close to a quarter of the cases (22.8%,118), however, two 
offenders worked together to commit the identity theft offenses.  There is a 
significant drop in the frequency of cases with more than two offenders.  There 
were three in 7.9% (41) cases, and four in 3.5% (18).  From there the number of 
cases with multiple offenders continues to decrease.  Seven cases had 10 or 
more offenders, with the largest number being 45.  
 
Figure 24. Number of Defendants
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Analysis of the roles that the offenders played in the commission of their crimes 
provides information on how the criminal actions differed according to the 
number of offenders involved in each case. It should be noted that a defendant or 
defendants could take more than one role within a case. Thus, the numbers are 
varied.  Personal identifying information was stolen or obtained by 609 
defendants. Of those 609, this role was taken most frequently by an offender who 
worked alone (one offender case) – in 40.2% (245) of these instances. The next 
most frequent role was using identification documents for own use. This role was 
taken by 476 defendants. Again, those offenders who worked alone took this role 
most frequently – 46% (219).  In 43.1% (81) of those cases in which offenders 
used identification to obtain additional identification documents there was only 
one offender. Two offender cases accounted for 19.7% (37).  In 70.4% (69) of 
the instances in which offenders took the role of altering identification documents,   45
there were one or two defendants involved in the case. As would be expected, 
one offender cases accounted for only 12% of cases in which others’ activities 
were directed, while cases with five or more offenders accounted for 37% (51).  
Again not surprisingly, information was distributed to others in a only a small 
number of one offender cases (13.5%, 20). This role was most often taken in 
cases with five or more offenders, 35.1% (52).  
 
It is interesting to note that the most frequent role, no matter how many offenders 
were involved, was stealing or obtaining personal identifying information. While it 
seems obvious that identity theft involves obtaining personal identifying 
information, conventional wisdom may have dictated that it is personal identifier 
documents or bank cards that are most often the point of vulnerability. With the 
exception of cases with four offenders, the second most frequent role is using 
identification documents for own use. In other words, once the offender had 
identification documents (genuine or counterfeit), he or she used them for 
personal gain, whether or not a group was involved. The two roles that are 
directly related to group criminal activity are directing others’ activities and 
distributing information to others. The data show that while these roles were 
taken most frequently in cases with two or more offenders, they accounted for 
10% or less of the roles that these multiple offenders took in committing their 
crimes.  However, a comparison between one offender and five or more in terms 
of directing other’s activity shows a logical disparity – 1.68% for one offender, 
10.16% for five or more. The same is true for distributing information to others -- 
2.10% for one, 10.36% for five or more.  
 
As the results show, the most common types of identity theft cases in the sample 
are those in which one individual operated alone or worked with one other person 
to initiate and complete an offense(s) of identity theft. These cases generally 
entailed obtaining or stealing personal identifying information and using it for their 
own use. Based on more detailed qualitative information provided in case 
investigation notes, those cases in which only one offender was involved were 
often driven by criminal opportunities that were assessed as desirable by the 
offender, with no recruitment of or consultation with criminal others. These 
offenders started with identity theft to lead to other criminal activity, and took on 
several roles. In the description below, the offender took advantage of a website 
to obtain personal identifying information. He used that information to further his 
scheme of selling counterfeit DVDs and to open credit accounts. A temporary job 
offered another point of opportunity.  He obtained personal identifying information 
from the company and used it to produce counterfeit identification documents 
and open accounts. This offender identified points of vulnerability, obtained 
personal identifier information, used it to produce counterfeit identification 
documents, and used it in illegal activity for his own gain.   46
 
One Offender – Several Opportunities and Roles 
The offender purchased a fake ID from  www.counterfeitlibrary.com and used it 
to procure a mailbox at Mailboxes Etc., as he needed an address to use in selling 
counterfeit DVDs that he obtained from Taiwan on eBay (auction fraud). Using 
www.counterfeitlibrary.com, the defendant purchased a fraudulent ID from an 
individual in England and used it to obtain a pre-paid credit card from Rite-Aid in 
another’s name. He also bought a counterfeit birth certificate and a Netbank 
account in another name, and received information on setting up Netbank 
accounts. He traded Netbank account information for credit card information. He 
also purchased 10 blank counterfeit birth certificates. While working as a 
temporary employee at an insurance company, he stole the names and personal 
identifiers of approximately 12 people and used them to obtain pre-paid credit 
cards using counterfeit licenses which he manufactured on his home computer.  
He purchased and used personal identifiers and credit card information to add 
users to the account, to get  additional cards, and to change the address.   
 
The crimes involving two offenders can be considered small level group crimes in 
that they can involve continuing actions designed to perpetuate the crimes. They 
can also be opportunistic in nature, as one of the offenders may serve as the 
“host” of the low level enterprise, having access to source identification 
information that becomes the catalyst for commission of the offense.  This is 
consistent with the President’s Identity Task Force Report which states on page 
12, “Occasionally, small clusters of individuals with no significant criminal records 
work together in a loosely knit fashion to obtain personal information and even to 
create false or fraudulent documents.” The following description of a small level 
group crime case illustrates this, as the second defendant had access to 
information which enabled the first defendant to perpetrate several crimes.  
Defendant two’s roles were stealing or obtaining personal identifying information, 
producing counterfeit identification documents, distributing the information to 
others, and selling identification documents. Defendant one obtained personal 
identifying information and identification documents, and used them both for her 
own use and to procure more identification documents. 
 
A small level group crime case 
Defendant two obtained personal identifying information from a source at a state 
Secretary of State office, for the purpose of selling it to people who needed to 
change their identities. Defendant one bought information, as well as birth and 
marriage certificates, from him and used them to obtain a driver’s license and 
Social Security number. She obtained several credit cards in the names and paid 
the bills for them. She used the false name at her place of employment and later 
received disability checks in that name. She also filed income taxes in that name. 
She stated that she had to change her identity to protect herself from the family 
of a person whom her brother murdered in self-defense approximately 30 years 
ago. Neither defendant had a prior arrest history. 
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As the number of offenders increases within cases, there is a greater similarity to 
operations within an actual criminal enterprise. There is a good chance that a 
specialization of services will exist within some of these larger groups, as well as 
a diversification of responsibilities in others. There may be a director of activities 
within the identity theft group, instructing others on their function within the group 
(i.e., altering authentic IDs, creating counterfeit IDs, laminating counterfeit IDs). 
In some cases there is more than one director of activities. The director may be 
the provider of raw materials that are dispersed or shared with the “line workers” 
within the group for activation in the field. Criminal proceeds are usually shared 
among the group. In other situations, fraudulent identification documents are sold 
to others outside of the group, and proceeds are shared within the group.  
 
Roles taken in an organized group case 
In a case with 16 defendants, the group used unauthorized credit card numbers 
to purchase airline tickets in their own names and to reserve hotel rooms through 
websites. They also used the names of others and driver’s licenses in those 
names as identification when flying.  Several of the defendants accessed 
workplace computers to obtain customers’ personal identifying information, which 
they distributed to the rest of the group. Billing documents were also used as a 
source of personal identifying information.  One defendant skimmed credit card 
numbers (other) at hotels where she was employed.  Two of the defendants were 
involved in distributing the information to others in the group. Three of them 
directed others. For example, they instructed and paid others to purchase tickets 
for them. They all used the stolen personal identifying information for their own 
use – purchasing tickets and booking hotel rooms for travel to various cities 
where a social organization to which they all belonged held meeting.   
 
In essence, the results show that while most of the crimes examined were one 
offender or two offender cases, special note should be taken of the close to 20% 
of the cases that involved 3 or more offenders. All of the crimes in the sample 
were planned and took advantage of some opportunity that presented itself to the 
offender(s). The cases involving larger numbers of offenders, however, 
distinguished themselves from the others in that the degree of coordination and 
organization was more pronounced. The activities of these groups were designed 
to take advantage of criminal opportunities, create opportunities for crime, and 
avoid detection. In that sense, they sought to preserve the continuity of their 
enterprise, as any other ongoing criminal enterprise would. 
 
Offender Methods 
 
In addition to examining the roles that the defendants took in the commission of 
the crimes, data was collected on the methods used to perpetrate them. The 
information was gathered in three categories: the Internet and the various ways 
in which it was used, technological devices, and non-technological means. The 
items in each category are as follows: 
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  The Internet  
o Unspecified  use 
o E-mail 
o Phishing 
o Hacking   
o 419  scam 
o Malware/viruses 
o  Online database searching 
o  Online ID purchase and/or sale 
o  Other (e.g. PayPal accounts, chat rooms, online purchases) 
 Technological  Devices 
o  Computers to scan documents 
o  Computers to produce documents 
o  Computer printers to produce documents 
o Photocopier 
o Typewriter 
o Digital  camera 
o Cell  phones 
o Telephone 
o  Other (access device reader, credit card encoder, fax machine, 
laminating machine, etc.) 
 Non-technological  means 
o Mail  theft 
o  Rerouting of mail (change of address cards) 
o  Dumpster diving – residential and business 
o Public  records 
 
This data was collected in an effort to determine the extent of Internet and 
technological use in committing identity theft and fraud. The report of the 
President’s Identity Theft Task Force states, “Criminals first gather personal 
information either through low-tech methods such as stealing mail or workplace 
records, or ‘dumpster diving,’ or through complex and high-tech frauds such as 
hacking and the use of malicious computer code” (April 2007, p. 10).  The data 
collected in this area also relates to the way in which technology was used to 
produce counterfeit documents and devices. 
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As shown in Figure 25, in 41% (212) of the cases, there was no use of the 
Internet, technological devices, or non-technological means.  In 51 of the cases 
(9.9%) the offenders used the Internet in some manner, but did not use any other 
technological devices or non-technological means.  In 5.8% (30) the Internet and 
technological devices were used.  All three – Internet, technological devices, and 
non-technological means were employed by offenders in only ten cases (1.9%).  
Technological devices, without the use of the Internet or non-technological 
means, were used in 118 cases (22.8%).  
 
Figure 25. Offender Methods
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It is interesting to note, as graphically depicted in Figure 26, that offenders used 
the Internet and/or other technological devices in approximately half of the cases 
(49.1%). In 50.9% (263) no Internet or technological devices were used.  
However, in 51 of those cases, offenders used non-technological means to 
facilitate their crimes.  
 
Figure 26.  Interrelationships among Methods 
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Offender Methods: Internet Alone   
The defendant in this case employed pharming to create duplications of an opera 
house website in at least 9 cities worldwide. When customers attempted to 
purchase opera tickets, the defendant captured their personal identifying 
information – names, addresses, phone numbers, and credit card numbers. The 
customers either received tickets at a higher cost or to a performance other than 
the one they requested. Some customers did not receive tickets. 
 
Utilization of Methods by Offenders 
 
Internet  
There were 102 cases that included the use of the Internet. Unspecified Internet 
use occurred most frequently – in 51 cases. It was used to search databases in 
27 cases, for e-mail in 16 cases, and for online identification document purchase 
and/or sale in 19 cases. In some cases more than one method of Internet use 
was used and therefore, recorded during data collection. For that reason, the 
number of uses totals more than 102. 
 
Technological Devices 
Technological devices, including computers and the other items listed above, 
whether used alone or in conjunction with the Internet and/or non-technological 
means, were used in 192 cases. Computers were most frequently used for 
producing documents – in 106 cases. They were used for scanning documents in 
62 cases and for unspecified purposes in 93. Computer printers were used in 68 
cases for producing documents, checks, and currency. Other frequently used 
technological devices were photocopiers (31 cases), telephone (31), and other, 
including access device readers (28). Again, there were combinations of 
computer uses and of computers and other technological devices in some of the 
cases, so the numbers total more than 192. 
 
Using Computers to Produce Documents   
The defendant procured personal identifying information by placing ads in 
newspapers stating that he was hiring and would accept applications at a local 
hotel. He would interview the individuals and collect their applications which 
included Social Security numbers, dates of birth, and bank account information 
for direct deposit of a payroll check. He would then create birth certificates and 
employment cards on a computer and use them to get driver’s licenses with his 
photograph and others’ names. He used the driver’s licenses to open bank 
accounts. He then manufactured counterfeit checks with the victims’ names on 
the computer.   
 
Non-technological Means 
Non-technological means, including mail theft, mail rerouting, and dumpster 
diving were used in 106 cases. The most frequent of these was the rerouting of 
mail through change of address cards and change of address for credit cards   52
and bank accounts. It occurred in 62 cases. Mail theft was an element of 46 
cases and dumpster diving was employed in 12 cases. Again, these means were 
used in combination in some cases, so the numbers total more than 106. 
 
Patterns of Offender Methods 
 
The data was examined to track variations in the use of the Internet, 
technological devices, and non-technological means according to the year in 
which the case was opened. The Secret Service opens cases once they have 
been referred to them and accepted. The year the case is opened is generally 
the year in which the crime was detected.   
 
Unfortunately, any trending analysis is premature, as there are very few 2005 
and 2006 closed cases. A continuation study is planned that will collect the 
necessary data to provide for this level of analysis. The following preliminary 
findings were observed. 
 
•  There is very little variation in the use of the Internet to commit identity 
theft from 2001 through 2004. The data indicate that in approximately 20% 
of the 2001–2004 cases the Internet was used.  
•  An interesting pattern in the use of technological devices was observed 
during a similar time period. There is a steady decline in the use of 
technology other than the Internet in the cases opened between 2001 and 
2004. In 2001 42.2% (27) of the cases involved the use of a technological 
device. That number dropped to 30% (17) in 2004. The decrease was 
steady in the intervening years:  38.5% (60) in 2002 and 34.8% (46) in 
2003.  
•  The use of non-technological means remained fairly steady across the 4 
years (2001-2004). The percentages were in the low twenties for this 
period. Offenders continued to use low-tech means such as mail theft, 
mail rerouting, and dumpster diving, but only in a small percentage of the 
cases. It should be noted that in some cases, the non-technological 
means were used in combination with the Internet and/or other 
technological devices.  
•  The limited data provided by closed 2005 and 2006 cases indicate the 
potential for shifts in the patterns above. However, the numbers are too 
small to draw any conclusions at this time.  
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Points of Compromise 
 
The case summaries were analyzed to discern the point of compromise or 
vulnerability at which personal identifying information was stolen. Such a point 
could be discerned in 274 of the cases.  As Figure 27 shows, businesses (all 
business: service, retail, financial industry, corporations) accounted for 50% 
(137) of all the cases in which a point of compromise could be identified. When 
compared to Figure 23, this number is lower than the number of cases involving 
identity theft through employment at private companies, insurance, retail 
business, the credit card industry, the service industry, and banks and financial 
institutions, which when added together total 161. There are two reasons for this:  
1. In some cases the researcher indicated that the identity theft occurred through 
employment, but did not mention it in the paragraph describing the offense and 
investigation; and  2. While the identity theft may have occurred at the offender’s 
place of employment, the theft may have been from a co-worker, not from the 
business. The next highest category is family, which for this analysis includes 
friends, as well. In 15.69% (43) of the cases, a family member or friend was the 
victim of identity theft. The personal identifiers were stolen from a home, car, or 
person (wallet, pocketbook) in 11.68% (32) of the offenses. Theft from mail 
occurred in 8.76% (24) and through the Internet in 6.20% (17) of the cases. 
Other includes well-known public people and crimes in which the victim 
participated in the criminal activity. 
 
Figure 27.  Points of Compromise for Identity Theft 
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Point of Compromise:  A Business 
This case originated when a bank fraud investigator contacted the Secret 
Service. The defendant was employed at a candy store and was terminated for 
stealing cash from the register during transactions. He also skimmed credit cards 
while employed there. Two major credit card issuers identified the business as a 
common purchase point for credit cards that were later used as counterfeit credit 
cards. The defendant admitted that he was paid by another person to skim the 
credit card numbers. The other person then used them to produce counterfeit 
credit cards which he sold with corresponding counterfeit identification 
documents. 
 
Point of Compromise:  A Family Member 
The victim in this case notified the Secret Service regarding the fraudulent use of 
her identity. Her ex-husband used her information to open two American Express 
card accounts and make charges to them. The defendant completed the credit 
card applications via the Internet. 
 
The Commission of the Offense in Summary 
 
Identity theft or fraud and larceny/theft were the offenses most frequently 
facilitated by identity theft. The majority of the cases did not involve insiders; 
most did not involve identity through employment. However, the point of 
vulnerability for identity theft was a business in half of the cases in which such a 
point could be discerned. In most of the cases, the offense(s) was committed by 
a single individual. The individual was most likely to steal or obtain personal 
identifying information and use it for his or her own use. In cases with more than 
one defendant, the most common roles were also stealing or obtaining personal 
identifying information and using it for personal gain. The methods used to 
commit the offenses included the Internet, other technologies, and non-
technological means. The Internet use was unspecified in most of the cases in 
which it was involved. Computers were used most frequently to produce 
fraudulent documents. The most common non-technological method use was 
change of address. 
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Victimization 
 
The Victims 
 
Data was collected and categorized concerning who or what the victim of the 
identity theft or fraud crime was. The categories include: 
 
 Individual  (people) 
  Financial Services Industry (banks, credit unions, American Express, 
Discover, MasterCard, Visa) 
  Retail (stores, car dealerships, gas stations, casinos, sports clubs, 
restaurants, hotels, hospitals, doctors’ offices, etc.) 
  Government agency (federal, state, and local) 
 Credit  Bureau 
  Insurance (life, car, property, casualty, health) 
  Education (public and private, all levels) 
  Unavailable (There was no indication of the victim in the file.) 
 
In some cases, more than one type of victim was identified. Therefore the total 
number of victims included in the 9 categories is 1102. For example, if a 
defendant stole personal identifying information by accessing computer records 
at the bank where he worked and used that information to open credit card 
accounts, the bank, the individuals, and the credit card company would all be 
victims. 
 
As Figure 28 shows, the largest percentage of victims was the financial services 
industry – 37.1% (409).The next largest group of victims was individuals – 34.4% 
(379).  21.3% (234) of the victims were retail establishments. 
 
 
Figure 28. Victims by Category
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Methods of Victimization (other than individuals) 
 
There are many ways in which the financial services industry was victimized. The 
most prevalent methods were using fraudulently obtained personal identifying 
information (FOPII) to obtain new credit card accounts, using FOPII to change 
credit card accounts (names, addresses, credit limits), applying for and obtaining 
fraudulent loans, using FOPII to open bank accounts, using FOPII to transfer 
funds from and between bank accounts, and uttering bad, forged or counterfeit 
checks using fraudulent identification documents. Figure 29 shows the frequency 
with which these occurred and the percentage of the cases in which they 
occurred. It should be noted that more than one of these could occur in the same 
case, so the numbers total more than the 409 cases in which financial services 
were victimized. For example, in one case the defendant used an individual’s 
genuine Social Security number to procure an automobile loan and to open 
several credit card accounts. The percentage is based on the 517 cases in the 
study.   
 
Figure 29.  Methods of Financial Services Industry Victimization
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Victimization of Financial Services Industry 
In a case brought to the attention of the Secret Service by a bank fraud 
investigator in 2004, the defendant used his deceased’s father’s Social Security 
number and name to obtain three loans and a credit card from the bank. He 
secured a vehicle loan from another bank and paid it off with a loan from a third 
bank, which he obtained with the same identifiers. He opened checking accounts 
using the fraudulent information at each of the banks. He admitted using a false 
income tax form to show income high enough to qualify for the loans. The 
defendant confessed that he used his father’s Social Security number and name 
to open all of the accounts and credit cards, and to apply for the loans. At the 
time of this criminal behavior, he was a resident of a halfway house on 
supervised release for a prior federal criminal conviction for financial fraud. He 
pled guilty to Social Security Fraud (42 USC 408(a)(7)(b) and was sentenced to 
two years of incarceration, three years of probation, and $64,000 in restitution. 
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The retail industry was also victimized by opening credit card accounts, as new 
credit card accounts include both store accounts and accounts such as 
MasterCard and Visa. Other methods of victimization include purchasing 
merchandise with fraudulent credit cards and purchasing merchandise with 
fraudulent credit cards and returning it for cash or store credit. Methods of 
government agency victimization included uttering stolen U.S. Treasury checks 
and bonds using fraudulent identification documents, using FOPII to collect 
entitlement payments, and using FOPII to file income tax returns and get refunds. 
 
All of these industries were vulnerable to victimization through employees 
stealing customer or client records to gain access to personal identifying 
information. The section on identity theft through place of employment shows that 
the financial services industry and the retail industry were most frequently victims 
of employee theft of personal identifying information. 
 
 
Offender Relationship to Individual Victims 
 
It is stated in the President’s Identity Theft Task Force report that “identity thieves 
have been known to prey on people they know, including coworkers, senior 
citizens for whom they are serving as caretakers, and even family members” 
(April 2007, p. 12). In collecting data for this research project, special attention 
was paid to the relationship between the offender and victim. The categories into 
which the relationships were classified include: 
 
  Stranger (The victim had never met the offender.) 
  Customer/Client (includes retail customers, client lists, and the like) 
  Family (immediate and extended – spouses, parents, siblings, 
grandparents, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews, cousins) 
 Friend/acquaintance 
 Co-worker/employer 
  Unavailable (There was no indication of the victim – offender relationship 
in the file.) 
 
Because in many cases there was more than one defendant and/or more than 
one victim, the number of relationships found is 909 among the 517 cases that 
were examined. For example, in one case the five defendants used credit cards 
belonging to one defendant’s parents to obtain new credit cards. They made 
false identification documents in the names of that defendant’s parents. One 
defendant also stole mail to gather personal identifying information. In that case, 
one offender-victim relationship is family. Since the four others were acquainted 
with his parents, the offender – victim relationships there are friend/acquaintance. 
Because the defendant who stole the mail did not know those victims, that 
relationship is stranger. 
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Figure 30 shows that the majority of offender – victim relationships involved an 
individual or individuals whom the offender did not know. Out of 909 
relationships, 59.4% (540) were categorized as stranger. The next most frequent 
relationship (other than those which were not indicated in the files) was 
customer/client. In 10.5% (95) of the relationships, the offender victimized an 
individual who had been a customer or client at his or her place of employment.  
Family relationships accounted for 5% (46).The offender victimized a friend or 
acquaintance in 3.1% (28) of the relationships. (These numbers differ from those 
shown in the point of compromise analysis. The family category in that analysis 
includes family, friends, coworkers, and employers. Here, while they were the 
victims, they were not necessarily the point of compromise.) The numbers are 
the same for relationships between the offender and a co-worker or employer. 
 
Figure 30.  Offender and Victim Relationships
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As the President’s Identity Theft Task Force reported, identity thieves often prey 
on people they know, but in most of the Secret Service cases they did not. 
However, there were cases of offenders taking advantage of the people for 
whom they were caring – both disabled and elderly, as well as cases in which 
spouses, parents, children, and extended family members were victimized. 
 
Offender-Victim Relationship: Caretaker-Employer 
In this case, the defendant was employed by a blind man who owned a 
management company. The defendant, a white female in her forties, embezzled 
over one million dollars in approximately three and a half years. Her employer 
trusted her implicitly and signed whatever documents she directed him to. Thus, 
she was able to make purchases, bill them to her employer, and pay for them 
from his personal checking account. She issued checks from his account, which 
he signed, to pay her personal bills, including credit cards, tuition, vacations, 
medical expenses, clothing, jewelry, insurance policies, and home 
improvements. She used his date of birth and Social Security number to obtain 
unauthorized credit card accounts in his name and requested a second card for 
the accounts in her name. She also changed the address on the cards to her 
own. She used wire transfer and computer generated checks on his revocable 
trust and limited partnership checking accounts to pay the credit card bills.   59
Defendants Stealing Identifying Information through Employment    
    
Data was collected regarding the theft of personal identifying information from the 
defendants’ places of employment. Of the 933 total defendants among the 517 
cases, 20.3% (189) accessed records at their place of employment in order to 
perpetrate identity theft.  The types of employment were categorized in the same 
way as the victims: 
 
  Financial Services Industry (banks, credit unions, American Express, 
Discover, MasterCard, Visa) 
  Retail (stores, car dealerships, gas stations, casinos, sports clubs, 
restaurants, hotels, hospitals, doctors’ offices etc.) 
  Government agency (includes federal, state, and local) 
 Credit  Bureau 
  Insurance (life, car, property, casualty, health) 
  Education (public and private, all levels) 
  Unavailable (While it was stated that the defendant accessed information 
at work, his or her type or place of employment was not specified in the 
case file.) 
 
As shown in Figure 31, of the 189 defendants who stole personal identifying 
information through employment, 59.7% (113) were employed in retail, such as 
stores, restaurants, hotels, gas stations, car dealerships, casinos, hospitals, and 
doctors’ offices.  22.2% (42) worked in the financial services industry – banks, 
credit unions, and credit card companies. This is consistent with the cases in 
which the offenses were perpetrated by an insider – most often the retail 
industry, followed by private corporations. Both are consistent with the most 
frequent point of compromise – all businesses. 
 
Figure 31.  Type of Employment used to Steal Identities
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Identity Theft through Employment: Hospital  
The defendant, whose first and last name were the same as the victim’s, used 
her position as a hospital employee to gain access to patients’ personal 
identifiers. The victim had given birth in the hospital and the defendant accessed 
her identifiers, which she used to obtain several credit card accounts. The victim 
became aware of the unauthorized accounts when she was contacted by 
Discover concerning a credit card for which she had not applied. She then 
obtained her credit history and found other retail credit card accounts which she 
had not authorized. 
 
Victimization in Summary 
 
Ninety percent of the victims were financial services businesses, retail 
businesses, and individuals. The method of victimization for the financial services 
industry was most frequently the use of fraudulently obtained personal identifying 
information to open new credit card accounts. They were also often the victims of 
fraudulent loan applications. The retail industry was also victimized through the 
opening of new credit card accounts, as well as by the fraudulent purchase of 
merchandise that was later returned for cash or store credit. In the majority of the 
cases, the offender did not know his or her victim. The retail industry was found 
to be most susceptible to identity theft by their employees.   61
Recommendations 
 
The distillation of this research study’s findings provides robust empirical 
information on which the law enforcement community can base enhanced 
proactive identity theft control and prevention efforts. It is the first study of its kind 
to provide to law enforcement agencies and corporate security and fraud 
investigators empirical data concerning the key factors of identity theft behavior 
and the conditions under which that behavior occurs. The recommendations 
presented here are based on the use of the study’s findings. While conjecture 
and conventional wisdom may have led to some of the same conclusions in the 
past, this study allows law enforcement and corporate security leaders and policy 
makers to point to the data as a basis for implementing them. These 
recommendations are an effort to ensure that the findings will be used to improve 
and increase proactive measures that law enforcement and fraud investigators 
use to combat identity theft. They fall into five categories: 
 
•  Proactive investigation, detection, prevention, and prosecution 
•  Enhanced law enforcement training 
•  Enhanced management of cases and resources 
•  Briefings for law enforcement executives so that they can develop policy, 
allocate resources, and advocate training based on empirical research 
• Future  research 
 
Proactive Measures 
 
The findings of this research study should result in proactive measures, including 
improved investigative methods and enhanced prevention and detection 
strategies for federal, state, and local law enforcement, as well as corporate 
security fraud investigators. 
 
Recommendation 1:  Local and state law enforcement leaders should 
encourage more cooperation with federal law enforcement where it has begun 
and foster it where it is not occurring. 
 
The manner in which the criminal justice system addresses the cases from the 
beginning underscores the instrumental role of local law enforcement in the 
referral of cases to the Secret Service. The referrals may result from victim 
reports of identity theft to local law enforcement, but also may be the product of 
the alertness of local officials in recognizing telltale signs of identity theft while 
investigating unrelated crimes. Local police and sheriffs’ departments often act 
as conduits to successful federal investigations and prosecutions of these cases. 
This trend shows a collaborative approach to investigating identity theft cases 
and should continue and increase.  Most of the cases were prosecuted under 
federal jurisdiction – a further indication of the cooperative and collaborative 
approach.    62
 
Recommendation 2:  Law enforcement at all levels should be aware of the 
offender characteristics and the role of identity theft in other crimes and apply 
that knowledge to their investigations. Law enforcement should share the 
information they find with corporate entities, such as the financial services 
industry, so that prevention and detection strategies can be enhanced. 
 
The findings show that identity theft offenders are diverse in terms of their age, 
race, and gender. The women were more likely to be black and were younger 
than the males who were involved.  Most of the offenders did not have prior 
arrest records, but of those who did, most were for related offenses such as fraud 
and theft of property. Most offenders used identity theft to facilitate crimes of 
fraud or theft. 
 
Recommendation 3:  The findings of this research study regarding federal and 
state statutes and disposition should be used as a basis on which to build policy 
and practice in prosecuting identity theft at all levels. 
 
While most of the cases were prosecuted federally, the reliance on newly 
enacted identity theft statutes figures prominently in the charging of offenders 
both on the federal and state jurisdictional levels. At the state level, identity theft 
statutes were most frequently charged. At the federal level, access device fraud 
and identity fraud statutes were charged the most. Wire fraud and mail fraud, 
which at one time were seen as the easiest under which to prosecute identity 
theft offenders, were used much less frequently. Once an investigation is 
initiated, it can likely take up to two years for the case to reach disposition. 
Prosecutors at both the federal and state levels had a slightly better chance of 
sending a convicted identity thief to prison than not (51%), and could expect to 
see the imprisoned offender sentenced to three years or less of incarceration. 
Restitution imposed was, by and large, commensurate with the amount of loss 
incurred by victims in the identity theft cases.  
 
Law Enforcement Training 
 
The findings of this applied research bring to light several characteristics of 
identity theft offenders and crimes that may not have been previously known and 
which can contribute to continued and improved investigation and prosecution. 
These include the offender demographics, the methods used in the commission 
of the crimes, the relationships between the offenders and their victims, and 
organized crime group activity. 
 
Recommendation 4:  The findings should be infused into the many fine existing 
training programs to move beyond assumptions and anecdotes and gain a 
greater understanding of identity theft. 
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A CD with figures from this study and notes for instructors will be prepared to 
move this recommendation forward. 
 
Management of Cases and Resources 
 
The results of this study allow law enforcement to see a spectrum of identity theft 
cases, rather than dealing with one at a time. Law enforcement managers can 
use this information to assign resources and prioritize cases. 
 
Recommendation 5:  The findings of this study should be reviewed by law 
enforcement executives to gain a broader picture of where to focus their 
resources to combat identity theft.  
 
The findings show that the actual dollar loss of the cases ranged from none to 
$13,000,000. The median loss was $31,356. While previous assumptions tended 
to point to the existence of dollar loss thresholds under which cases would not be 
investigated or prosecuted, the findings here show that there is value in pursing 
identity theft cases even if the dollar loss is minimal or non-existent.  The findings 
regarding geographical distribution and scope, show that the identity theft cases 
were evenly distributed across the United States and that the scope of the 
offenses was evenly distributed among local, state, and interstate. In other 
words, identity theft cases are not more prevalent in one area of the country than 
another and are not limited by local or state boundaries. This information, along 
with that about referrals from local and state law enforcement, will help law 
enforcement managers effectively allocate personnel and funds. 
  
Recommendation 6:  So that law enforcement agencies at all levels can share 
case information, collaborate on investigations, and better prioritize and manage 
their cases and resources, standardized case classifications should be 
established.  Based on the empirical findings, consideration should be given to 
including identity theft as a primary classification code. 
 
As was explained earlier, the Secret Service assigns a primary classification 
code to its cases and one or more secondary classification codes. The most 
frequent primary case type was “Fraudulent Use of Account Numbers,” while the 
most prevalent secondary one was “Identity Fraud.” A common system of 
classification of identity theft cases would help in the management of cases and 
resources, as it would provide better measurement of the size and scope of 
identity theft cases and more efficient information sharing among federal, state, 
and local law enforcement agencies.  
 
Executive Briefings 
 
In addition to the law enforcement training that is recommended here and for 
which materials are provided, the relevant findings should be disseminated to law   64
enforcement executives so that they can develop policy, allocate resources, and 
advocate training based on empirical research.   
 
Recommendation 7:  A briefing on the research findings which will aid law 
enforcement executives in developing and implementing policies and procedures 
for investigation and prosecution of identity theft crimes should be made 
available.   
 
This briefing should focus on conclusions drawn from the findings in the areas of 
offender methods, points of compromise, organized crime activity, insider 
criminal activity, and the victims.  
 
Recommendation 8:  A briefing on the research findings which will provide law 
enforcement executives with cutting edge information to share with corporations 
should be made available. 
 
This briefing will focus on the points of compromise and vulnerabilities which 
provide opportunities for employees and others to steal personal identifying 
information, as well as the methods they use to perpetrate the theft.  
Corporations receiving this information will be able to use it in the development of 
policies and procedures to prevent, detect, and mitigate identity theft and fraud. 
 
Future Research 
 
This research study should be used as a model for a series of studies. The study 
of closed Secret Service cases from 2000-2006 resulted in a rich data set which 
will be used to assist law enforcement agencies and corporations in their fight 
against identity theft and fraud. However, criminals are continually adapting to 
law enforcement investigative methods by designing new methods for committing 
such crimes. In order to combat these crimes, law enforcement needs up-to-date 
information on trends, patterns, and groups, both current and emerging, to move 
from a reactive posture to a proactive one.  
 
Recommendation 9:  This model for research should be applied to cases held 
by local, state, and other federal law enforcement agencies.  
 
Recommendation 10:  Building on the baseline created through this research, 
further longitudinal study of Secret Service closed cases with an identity theft 
component should be undertaken to determine trends and patterns of the crime 
in the near past and to anticipate future trends and areas of vulnerability. 
 
All of the recommendations posited here will be better served and implemented if 
more applied research studies, such as this one, are completed. The ultimate 
goal of this and future studies is increased proactive investigation, prevention, 
and prosecution of these crimes.   65
Conclusion 
 
The media, public service announcements, and public and private sector 
literature concerning identity theft and prevention methods have been 
instrumental in educating the public about the threat and consequences of 
identity theft. Some characterizations have emphasized identity theft as more of 
a stranger-to-stranger crime. Others have underscored the importance of not 
falling into a level of complacency that would open the doors for friends and 
relatives to take advantage of the unwary victim. Still other descriptions have 
focused on the methods practiced, ranging from relatively simplistic acts such as 
“dumpster diving” and mail theft to more sophisticated criminal activities that 
depend upon the victim’s and offender’s use of the Internet. While provocative, 
much of this information is based upon surveys and reports that often leave key 
questions unanswered from an empirical standpoint. Not presuming that the 
analysis of closed case data on identity theft crimes is definitive, this study of 
closed Secret Service cases provides empirical evidence about identity theft in 
the United States from a law enforcement point of view and can be extrapolated 
to local and state law enforcement. 
 
The analysis of the cases revealed that while identity theft can occur anywhere, it 
was concentrated in the Northeast and South. The manner in which the criminal 
justice system addressed the cases from the beginning underscores the 
instrumental role of local law enforcement in the referral of cases to the Secret 
Service. Local police and sheriffs’ departments often acted as conduits to 
successful federal investigations and prosecutions of these cases. The referrals 
may have resulted from victim reports of identity theft to local law enforcement, 
but were also the product of the alertness of local officials in recognizing telltale 
signs of identity theft through the investigation of other crimes entirely unrelated 
to identity theft. While most of the cases were, ultimately, prosecuted federally, 
the reliance on newly enacted identity theft statutes figured prominently in the 
charging of offenders both on the federal and state jurisdictional levels. 
Prosecutors had a slightly better chance of sending a convicted identity thief to 
prison than not (51%), and could expect to see the imprisoned offender 
sentenced to three years or less of incarceration. Restitution imposed was, by 
and large, commensurate with the amount of loss incurred by victims in the 
identity theft cases.  
 
While some of the findings about the offenders may not be surprising, others 
seem to contradict the image that, in some ways, has been formed by default: 
that identity thieves are usually white males. The results show that identity theft is 
a crime that minorities are just as apt to commit as whites. The number of 
younger offenders, female offenders, and female black offenders in these crimes 
is noteworthy.  
 
The case analysis indicates that the offenders could be separated into two 
groups: those who engaged in identity theft practices as isolated events as   66
opportunities presented themselves (i.e., in the form of criminal opportunities 
such as access to customer/client information through the offender’s place of 
employment) and those who actively pursue identity theft as part of a property 
theft criminal career (as demonstrated by the types of crimes in the offenders’ 
criminal histories). In these cases, the identity thefts do not happen by accident, 
but are planned criminal events, usually motivated by a desire for financial gain.  
The type and extent of planning differs according to how many offenders 
collaborate to commit these offenses and the degree to which they are seen by 
the offenders as short or long term ventures. In most cases, identity theft was 
shown to be the act of solitary criminals or criminals operating in fairly 
unsophisticated two-person teams. Incidents of organized group activity were 
fairly rare, but when they did occur, the acts of the offenders were more 
specialized and the roles assumed by the offenders were often interchangeable. 
In short, such cases reflected the type of organizational characteristics that mirror 
the activities of conventional law-abiding ventures. Leaders exercised a span of 
control designed to optimize the success and profits of the identity theft acts. 
There appeared to be a connection between the size and organizational 
sophistication of identity theft operations and the profits reaped.  
 
Analysis of the methods employed by the offenders showed that Internet and/or 
other technological devices were used in approximately half of the cases. In 
some cases, the offenders began with a non-technological act, such as mail 
theft, to obtain the personal identifying information, but then used devices such 
as digital cameras, computers, scanners, laminators and cell phones to produce 
and distribute fraudulent documents. While the use of the Internet as a criminal 
tool had a presence, it did not appear to be a necessity for most offenders to 
reach their goals 
 
The findings show that the financial services industry was just as likely to be 
victimized as an individual. The spectrum of methods used was wide, but usually 
originated in the fraudulent use of personal identifying information. With this 
information, offenders obtained new credit card accounts, changed credit card 
accounts opened bank accounts, transferred funds from and between bank 
accounts, and forged checks. Customers fell prey to identity thieves through 
simple business transactions conducted in stores, restaurants, hotels, service 
stations and automobile dealerships, as well as other retail entities. While not in 
the majority, both financial service and retail industries were found to be 
vulnerable to the theft of personal information through employee access. 
According to the case analysis, there was a one in three chance that the 
victimization was a result of the work of an insider. 
  
The case analysis results refute some presumptions about the relationship 
between the offender and the victim. While there were instances in which 
relatives and friends proved to be the perpetrators, they were in the minority. The 
typical identity theft criminal took advantage of those not personally known to him 
or her. In terms of loses incurred by identity theft victims, the median loss was   67
$31,356. In general, the more offenders involved in the case, the higher the 
victim loss was. 
 
This study is significant because it did not depend on self-reported or survey 
data. The closed Secret Services cases provided reliable information which was 
collected objectively and analyzed to reach conclusions. The impact of these 
findings will be measured by the effective application of the recommendations 
concerning proactive law enforcement methods, enhanced law enforcement 
training, management of cases and resources, policy development, and future 
research. 
 
.  
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Appendix  
 
Collection Template   69
CASE TITLE:         CASE # 
DEFENDANT(S):  
   RACE  SEX  DOB  Place  of 
Birth 
D 1        
D 2        
D 3        
D 4        
D 5        
 
REGION:   
 
CASE TYPE:   
 
SECONDARY TYPES: 
Code  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
CROSS REFERENCED CASES:   
 
ACTUAL LOSS:  
 
STATUTES VIOLATED:  
 
DATE OPENED: 
  
DATE CLOSED: 
  
   DISPOSITION 
D 1 
 
 
D 2 
 
 
D 3 
 
 
D 4 
 
 
D  5 
 
   70
Criminal Record  Arrests  Convictions 
D  1 
 
  
D  2 
 
  
D  3 
 
  
D  4 
 
  
D  5 
 
  
 
DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION 
 
Case Origination: 
  
Case Notes:  
 
Jurisdiction:   
 
Evidence:   
 
ROLE  D 1  D 2  D 3  D 4  D 5 
Steal/obtain info           
Steal/obtain docs           
Steal/obtain bank cards           
Alter IDs           
Produce counterfeit ids           
Distribute info to others           
Sell IDS           
Use ID for own use           
Use ID to get more ID 
docs 
     
Direct others’ activities           
Other          
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  D 1  D 2  D 3  D 4  D 5 
Non-citizen          
If non-citizen, country           
ID theft thru 
employment? 
     
Type of employment  ------ ------ ------ ------ ------
      Gov. Agency           
      Bank/Credit Union           
      Credit Bureau           
      Service           
      Retail           
      Insurance           
      Credit Card           
      Education           
      Private Company           
      Unavailable           
 
 
Facilitation  ID Theft 
facilitates 
Facilitates  
ID Theft 
Homicide    
Assault    
Sexual Assault     
Burglary    
Robbery    
Larceny/Theft    
Fraud    
Drug Trafficking     
Drug Possession     
Embezzlement    
Forgery /Counterfeiting     
Weapons    
Arson    
Immigration    
Family Offense     
Traffic (not DUI/DWI)     
DUI/DWI    
Credit Card Skimming     
Telephone Scam/Solicitation     
Internet Scam/Solicitation     
Gun Running     
Human Trafficking     
Other:      
   72
 
Victim-Offender 
Relationship 
D 1  D 2  D 3  D 4  D 5 
Immediate Family           
Extended Family           
Friend            
Co-worker/employer          
Acquaintance          
Customer/Client          
Stranger          
Unavailable          
 
Victim  
      Gov. Agency   
      Bank/Credit Union   
      Credit Bureau   
      Service   
      Retail   
      Insurance   
      Credit Card   
      Education   
      Individual   
      Unavailable   
 
Technology and Devices   
Internet    
        E-mail   
        Phishing   
        Hacking   
        419 Scam   
        Malware/Viruses   
        Database Searching   
        Online ID purchase and/or sale   
        Other   
Computers (other than Internet)   
        Scanning documents   
        Producing documents   
Printer  
Copier     
Typewriter  
Digital Camera   
Cell Phones   
Telephone  
Other    73
 
Means    
Mail theft    
Rerouting of mail (change of address cards)    
Dumpster diving residential   
Dumpster diving business   
Public Records   
  
Geographical Scope   
Local  
Within state   
Interstate  
International  
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